Trezor warned on October 30, 2026 that customers who bought a device from CryptoBilis from March 2026 onwards should move their funds to a newly created wallet with a new seed. Its security notice follows a report of a hardware implant inside a Trezor Safe 5. The company has not yet received the device for examination.
The warning covers every Trezor model bought through the reseller, although the reported device is a Safe 5. Trezor says it has no evidence of customer losses. The customer who disclosed the suspected implant had moved his funds before discovering it. The company also says self-custody prevents it from seeing the balances in customers’ wallets.
What the customer reported
Trezor received the responsible disclosure on October 28. The customer had bought the device from CryptoBilis through Tokopedia in August 2026. At the time of that purchase, CryptoBilis was an authorized Trezor reseller in Southeast Asia. It remained in the company’s reseller network until October, when Trezor removed it.
According to the customer’s report, as described in the notice, an extra circuit board sits between the device’s main board and screen. The board includes a cellular module and an antenna. The alleged implant reads material displayed on the screen, including the wallet backup, and transmits it over a mobile network when the device is plugged in. Trezor says it has not verified that account itself.
The security team has received photographs and interviewed the reporter over a video call. It is arranging shipment of the device to its lab for examination. Trezor says what it has seen looks sophisticated enough to warrant a warning before physical inspection. Waiting for confirmation, it says, would leave CryptoBilis buyers exposed. The company is treating the disclosure as credible while it awaits the device.
Ledger was already investigating the reseller. Trezor’s notice says Ledger began investigating losses among CryptoBilis customers on October 9 and later confirmed physical tampering in some devices. Trezor removed CryptoBilis as an authorized reseller on October 9 and began investigating customer devices. The new disclosure reached Trezor while that investigation was still underway.
Trezor says it does not know who is responsible. Its notice describes an apparent similarity to implants found in Ledger devices, but the company declines to draw comparisons while the investigations continue. Manufacturers build their devices differently, it says. Trezor is working with Ledger and other parties involved in the investigations to share information.
Which buyers should act
The precaution covers purchases from March 2026 onwards, before the reported August purchase. It also applies to any store selling devices supplied by CryptoBilis, including the reseller’s Tokopedia store. Customers who are unsure where their device came from are directed to check the seller name on their receipt or contact Trezor Support.
Customers with funds on an affected device are told to transfer them to a wallet generated with a new seed as soon as possible. Trezor warns: “Using the wallet backup generated by the tampered wallet on another device does not solve the issue.” The replacement wallet needs a fresh backup. Restoring the potentially exposed backup on a different device leaves the problem unresolved.
Customers without another secure hardware wallet available can temporarily use a software wallet or an exchange they know, according to the notice. Trezor asks them to check the full receiving address carefully before sending funds. Buyers who have not yet set up their CryptoBilis device should leave it uninitialized. They must not enter an existing wallet backup into it.
Trezor advises customers against trying to establish whether a device is safe by weighing or opening it. The reporter noticed a weight difference, but the company says small variations can have other causes. A scale cannot confirm or exclude tampering. Trezor says there is no dependable way for customers to inspect a device themselves.
Customers who bought from CryptoBilis from March 2026 onwards can receive a new device shipped directly by Trezor or a voucher covering the cost of a replacement. Trezor asks eligible customers to keep the original device and arrange the replacement through Support. The company reports no cases involving other resellers.
The notice also warns that scammers may exploit the incident through fake emails, physical letters and phone calls. Trezor Support will never ask for a wallet backup. Customers are instructed never to share their recovery phrase with anyone, including someone who presents themselves as part of the response to this incident.
Moving funds without introducing another loss
The notice links to Trezor’s sending guide. Each Suite account corresponds to a single network and can send only on that network, according to the guide. The recipient must use the same network. Sending to an unsupported network can lose the funds, so moving a balance requires checking the destination network as well as the receiving address.
The guide directs users to get the receiving address from the destination wallet or the exchange’s deposit screen. It warns against copying an address from transaction history, where an attacker can plant a lookalike through address poisoning. Users preparing a transfer should take the address from the destination itself.
In the desktop interface, Suite’s account picker shows only accounts on activated networks. Users can enable a missing network under Settings, then Networks. The controls for sending an account’s native coin differ from those for sending a token. The account has a Send action; its Tokens tab has a Send arrow beside each token.
Signing and broadcasting are separate steps. According to the guide, users can still cancel a signed transaction before broadcast. After clicking Send, they cannot take it back. Suite initially displays the transfer as unconfirmed. It adds a confirmation time after the network includes the transaction in a block.
Trezor has yet to examine the reported device in its lab. The implant’s operation and the identity of whoever installed it remain unconfirmed.
