At 07:48 UTC on October 14, 2026, PancakeSwap’s Kitchen opened forum post 3031 with The Flip proposal. It would give liquidity providers 88% of swap fees on v3 and Infinity, leave 12% for the Treasury, and cut daily $CAKE emissions from 22,500 to 7,000.
The proposal is still a discussion draft. The Kitchen plans to review forum feedback before publishing a final proposal for a Snapshot vote. No fee split or emissions change has passed yet.
The design joins two decisions that PancakeSwap previously handled with separate incentives. One reallocates trading revenue from the protocol to LPs. The other removes most of the token emissions now used after veCAKE. LPs would rely more heavily on fees generated by actual swaps, while the Kitchen would retain a smaller protocol share and a new emissions budget for ecosystem spending.
The 88/12 fee split
Every v3 fee tier and Infinity pool on PancakeSwap’s 11 supported chains would move to an 88/12 split. LPs on most pools currently retain around two-thirds of the fees they generate. The proposal therefore moves roughly one-third more fee revenue to LPs at the same trading volume.
The change would apply automatically to every v3 and Infinity position. LPs would not need to claim, stake or lock anything new. Fees would continue accruing to positions through the existing process, but a larger portion would go to the LP.
PancakeSwap illustrates the split with a pool that generates $1,000 in swap fees. Under The Flip, its LPs would keep $880. The Kitchen estimates that v3 and Infinity LPs would have received about $62M more if the proposed split had applied to PancakeSwap’s 2025 volume. That estimate is a historical simulation, not a forecast of future revenue. It depends on future volume and liquidity being comparable with the period PancakeSwap used.
The redistribution also changes which part of the system pays for liquidity. Under the proposed split, the Treasury accepts a smaller portion of swap fees so positions receive more of the revenue already produced by trading. The separate emissions cut then reduces the amount of newly minted $CAKE available as an incentive. PancakeSwap describes the combined goal as funding growth through platform activity instead of new supply. This makes pool volume more important to LP compensation and leaves the Treasury with the stated 12% protocol share on v3 and Infinity.
The automatic application matters operationally. A v3 or adjustable Infinity LP would not have to exit a position, enter a new staking contract or make a separate claim to receive the new share. The proposal says fees would accrue as they do now. That removes a migration step, but it does not make every position equally profitable. The Kitchen’s $62M estimate aggregates the result across the prior year’s volume. It does not allocate that amount among fee tiers, chains or individual LP ranges.
The proposal keeps the published fee tiers unchanged for new and adjustable pools, so a trader using those pools would pay the same listed fee. PancakeSwap argues that the richer LP share could support up to 30% more liquidity because providers add capital until returns return to a competitive level. It projects that deeper pools could cut price impact by as much as 20% to 25% for the same trade. Those outcomes are estimates in the proposal, not guaranteed consequences of the fee switch.
Existing Infinity pools need separate treatment. Their LP fees were fixed when each pool was created. For those pools, lowering the protocol fee would lower the total swap fee instead of increasing the LP portion. PancakeSwap gives the example of a pool with a 1% fee falling to about 0.76%, with 0.67% going to LPs and about 0.091% going to the protocol. The proposal does not say that existing positions in those pools will be recreated with a higher LP rate.
PancakeSwap v2 would remain outside the change because its fees are hard-coded. The proposal says v2 sends 23% of swap fees to burn and remains the protocol’s main $CAKE burn engine. Keeping v2 unchanged preserves that burn route while v3 and Infinity move to the new split.
For LPs, the immediate mechanism is clear: eligible positions receive a greater share of each fee without a migration or a new lock. Actual dollar income would still depend on pool volume, capital concentration, position range and the amount of competing liquidity. The proposal supplies a protocol-wide historical estimate, not a return estimate for any position.
For traders, the direct effect differs by pool. Published fee tiers stay the same where the split can be adjusted, while qualifying legacy Infinity pools may have a lower total fee. Any reduction in price impact depends on LPs adding enough capital after the economics change. PancakeSwap also expects deeper pools to leave less room for sandwich attacks and similar MEV because those strategies profit from price impact.
Emissions move to the Pantry
The Flip would cut post-veCAKE emissions by about 69%. Daily issuance would fall from 22,500 $CAKE to 7,000 $CAKE, reducing minting by 15,500 $CAKE per day and about 5.7M $CAKE per year. The remaining daily emissions would go to a new ecosystem fund called the Pantry rather than being distributed through the current emissions program.
The Kitchen says it would deploy the Pantry flexibly for marketing, partnership deals and bootstrapping liquidity in new pools. The draft does not set fixed allocations among those uses. It also does not describe spending caps, recipient-selection rules or a separate Pantry approval process. Those omissions matter because the proposal would concentrate the remaining emissions in a fund administered by the Kitchen. The final governance text can answer whether Pantry spending will require public proposals, reporting or other controls.
The emissions cut is paired with the larger fee share on purpose. PancakeSwap’s stated model is to make trading fees the primary way it attracts liquidity instead of minting more $CAKE for that role. LP compensation would therefore become more sensitive to organic trading activity. The Pantry would preserve a smaller token budget for pools or partnerships that the Kitchen decides need direct support.
The proposal places the cut against Tokenomics 3.0, which passed in April 2025 and targeted a roughly 20% supply reduction by 2030. PancakeSwap says supply has declined 11.5% in the 18 months since that vote. Using the average net burn from the previous 10 weeks, it reports a decline of about 190,000 $CAKE per week after emissions, equivalent to about 9.9M $CAKE or 3% per year.
That burn rate is backward-looking. PancakeSwap projects that maintaining it would remove the remaining 31.6M $CAKE needed to reach the Tokenomics 3.0 target around the end of 2029. The calculation depends on v2 activity, burns and the proposed emissions level continuing at the assumed pace. The draft says v2 alone would keep supply net deflationary, but the realized path will vary with usage.
For $CAKE holders, the change would reduce new supply while creating a discretionary destination for all remaining daily emissions. That trade is different from a complete end to issuance. The Pantry would still receive 7,000 $CAKE each day, and the value of that budget would depend on how the Kitchen deploys it. Holders assessing the proposal need both sides of the mechanism: less minting overall and more centralized discretion over what is still minted.
Governance and rollout
The forum post starts the governance process rather than completing it. The Kitchen asked LPs, traders and $CAKE holders to submit feedback, then said it would review the comments before publishing the final proposal for a Snapshot vote. The Snapshot text may therefore differ from the current forum draft.
If voters approve the final version, implementation is scheduled to begin in November 2026 within two weeks of passage. PancakeSwap expects a rollout lasting about three months and finishing by the end of January 2027. The team plans to announce each chain as it goes live, so the economics may change network by network rather than at one instant.
That sequence gives operators two checkpoints. The first is the final Snapshot proposal, where the Pantry’s controls and the treatment of existing Infinity pools can be compared with the discussion draft. The second is each chain announcement, which determines when positions on that network begin using the new split. Until the vote passes and a chain goes live, LPs should not model the 88% share as active revenue.
The unresolved governance question is how much discretion the final proposal gives the Kitchen over the Pantry. The forum draft names possible uses but no allocation, reporting or approval rules. The next formal milestone is the Snapshot vote, followed, if approved, by the first chain implementation in November 2026.
