Optimizely confirms attack after malware reaches Ledger website

Nick Sawinyh on 17 Nov 2026

On November 17, 2026, Optimizely confirmed that an attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation platform to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects. The company says it fixed the vulnerability and removed the code. Report URI’s investigation names Ledger among the websites whose Optimizely scripts carried the payload during the previous day’s attack.

The malware substituted crypto addresses in the browser. Report URI found code that replaced legitimate recipient addresses with attacker-controlled addresses, including on Ethereum, other EVM chains and Solana. It advises visitors to check transfers made after visiting an affected site against the recipient address they intended to use.

Optimizely’s notice, posted at 01:02 UTC, says it also secured affected user accounts and added protections against further unauthorized code delivery. In a separate statement, the company said: “The vulnerable path is blocked, the injected code was removed, and customers have been contacted directly.”

The browser received code from a trusted supplier

Report URI examined 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations. Its list includes Ledger, Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC and Salesforce. The researchers retained each infected file with response headers, a hash and a fetch time. The sample is incomplete: they could only check snippets they could locate during the investigation.

The attacker changed the Project JavaScript field inside customer projects. According to Report URI, the rest of each snippet stayed intact. The file continued to arrive from Optimizely’s own content delivery domain with its certificate, through a dependency that affected websites already loaded. The researchers traced the modification to the project configuration and ruled out cache poisoning as the explanation for what the delivery network served.

Optimizely’s developer documentation explains how code in that field runs. Project JavaScript runs at the snippet level and can affect every experiment. Functions and variables have their own scope, but a developer can expose them globally at the Window level. It is also the snippet’s first point of execution, allowing code to run without a change to the customer’s native website code.

The injected loader was not always visible as a plain domain name. Report URI found a version that hid the destination with base64 encoding, so searching for the attacker’s domain would miss it. Another variant embedded the full payload and executed it through eval if the external destination was blocked. The researchers also observed a Smartsheet snippet being cleaned and then reinfected with the encoded version. Write access remained available at that point in their investigation.

Address replacement did not require data to leave the page

The malware searched for valid addresses and checked their checksums before substituting the attacker’s address. It targeted form fields, links and images as well as displayed text. It also intercepted clipboard operations, outgoing browser requests, navigation and the iOS share sheet, according to Report URI’s inspection of the code.

The script rescanned whenever the page changed. Report URI warned that copying an address while an affected tab remained open could result in the attacker’s address being pasted, including when the address came from somewhere else. Checking a transfer requires comparing the address with the intended recipient. The substituted address can still look valid.

Browser restrictions on outbound traffic offered only partial protection in some cases. Report URI found that connect-src rules blocked card, cookie and screenshot exfiltration on some affected sites while address replacement still worked inside the page. Blocking the destination used to collect stolen data did not stop the script from changing the recipient a visitor copied.

The same payload collected information when it replaced an address near wallet or payment wording. That collection included the page URL, the original addresses, cookies accessible to JavaScript and a screenshot rendered with html2canvas. Cookies marked HttpOnly were outside the set exposed through document.cookie, the interface the researchers identified.

Payments and session data were also exposed

Report URI places the addition of a card skimmer at 13:43 UTC on November 16. It watched form submissions and outgoing POST requests for a card number, expiry date and security code. The number had to pass a Luhn check before the collection logic sent the completed set to the attacker’s server using the browser’s sendBeacon function.

The researchers distinguish card fields built directly into a website from hosted payment frames. Cards typed into a site’s own fields were reachable by the skimmer. Cards entered inside hosted payment iframes, including those supplied by Stripe or Adyen, were outside its reach. An infected snippet alone does not establish that every card payment on the site was exposed; the observed code could capture payments entered into the site’s own fields.

Apple mobile devices faced an additional attack path. Report URI found that the script loaded a separate component on iPhones and iPads, read the operating system version and selected an exploit chain inside a hidden iframe. Its inspection identified Coruna for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18.x. The component selected for iOS 26 was only fingerprinting the device at the time of the investigation.

Report URI recommends reviewing users, API tokens and integrations with permission to write to an Optimizely account, then rotating credentials. It also advises treating session tokens or secrets held in cookies without HttpOnly as exposed and rotating them. For websites with their own card fields, the researchers recommend treating cards entered on November 16 as potentially exposed. Visitors who paid on an affected site should watch their card statements.

Optimizely’s public notice confirms exploitation of a vulnerability but gives no technical description of it. Report URI left the route to cross-customer write access unresolved. The operator’s notice does not identify that route or publish a complete list of affected projects.

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About the author
Nick Sawinyh founded DeFiprime in 2019 and has edited it ever since. His current editorial focus is stablecoin infrastructure, real-world assets on-chain, DeFi yield and risk, and crypto regulation. Based on the East Coast, US. He holds small positions across a range of crypto assets; nothing he publishes is investment advice.

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